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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
Ambro, Circuit Judge 
 We address what happens when one provision of an 
indenture for money loaned provides that the debt is 
accelerated if the debtor files for bankruptcy and while in 
bankruptcy it opts to redeem that debt when another indenture 
provision provides for a redemption premium. Does the 
premium, meant to give the lenders the interest yield they 
expect, fall away because the full principal amount is now 
due and the noteholders are barred from rescinding the 
acceleration of debt? We hold no. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A. The Notes 
 Energy Future Intermediate Holding Company LLC 
and EFIH Finance Inc. (collectively, “EFIH”) borrowed in 
2010 approximately $4 billion at a 10% interest rate by 
issuing Notes due in 2020 and secured by a first-priority lien 
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on their assets (the “First Lien Notes”). To protect (at least in 
part) the lenders’ anticipated interest-rate yield, the Indenture 
governing the loan (the “First Lien Indenture”) provides in 
§ 3.07, captioned “Optional Redemption,” that “[a]t any time 
prior to December 1, 2015, [EFIH] may redeem all or a part 
of the Notes at a redemption price equal to 100% of the 
principal amount of the Notes redeemed plus the Applicable 
Premium . . . and accrued and unpaid interest” (emphasis in 
original). “Applicable Premium” is what we shall call the 
make-whole, or yield-protection, contractual substitute for 
interest lost on Notes redeemed before their expected due 
date. 
 The First Lien Indenture contains an acceleration 
provision in § 6.02 that makes “all outstanding Notes . . . due 
and payable immediately” if EFIH files a bankruptcy petition. 
The same provision also gives the First Lien Noteholders the 
right to “rescind any acceleration [of] the Notes and its 
consequences[.]” 
 EFIH borrowed funds again in 2011 and 2012 by 
issuing two sets of Notes secured by a second-priority lien on 
its assets (the “Second Lien Notes”). As with the First Lien 
Noteholders, EFIH promised to pay holders of the Second 
Lien Notes (the “Second Lien Noteholders”) a make-whole 
premium—in a provision essentially identical to the one 
quoted above—if it chose to redeem the Second Lien Notes, 
at its option, on or before a date certain (May 15, 2016 for 
Second Lien Notes set to mature in 2021 and March 1, 2017 
for those maturing in 2022). 
 The Indenture for the Second Lien Notes (the “Second 
Lien Indenture”) contains an acceleration provision different 
from § 6.02 of the First Lien Indenture: if EFIH files a 
bankruptcy petition, “all principal of and premium, if any, 
interest . . .[,] and any other monetary obligations on the 
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outstanding Notes shall be due and payable immediately[.]” 
Second Lien Indenture § 6.02 (emphases added). Like the 
First Lien Noteholders, the Second Lien Noteholders have the 
right to “rescind any acceleration [of] the Notes and its 
consequences” under § 6.02. 
 B. Refinancing the First Lien Notes 
 When market interest rates went down, EFIH 
considered refinancing the Notes. Refinancing outside of 
bankruptcy would have required it to pay the make-whole 
premium. See In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 527 B.R. 
178, 188 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015). By filing for bankruptcy, 
however, EFIH believed it might avoid the premium. So on 
November 1, 2013, it filed an 8-K form with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission “disclosing [its] proposal 
[whereby] . . . EFIH would file for bankruptcy and refinance 
the Notes without paying any make-whole amount.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Six months later, on April 29, 2014, EFIH and other 
members of its corporate family filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
petitions in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Delaware. Once in bankruptcy, EFIH sought to “take 
advantage of highly favorable debt market conditions to 
refinance,” beginning with the First Lien Notes. Id. at 189. It 
asked the Bankruptcy Court for leave to borrow funds to pay 
them off and to offer a settlement to any of its First Lien 
Noteholders who agreed to waive their right to the make-
whole.  Id. at 182, 189. 
 Fearing loss of the income stream EFIH had promised, 
the Trustee for the First Lien Noteholders—Delaware Trust 
Company—filed an adversary proceeding on May 15, 2014. 
It sought a declaration that refinancing the First Lien Notes 
would trigger the make-whole premium. 
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 EFIH’s bankruptcy filing caused the “[First Lien] 
Notes [to] be[come] due and payable immediately” under 
Indenture § 6.02, subject to the right of their holders to 
rescind acceleration. So the Trustee also requested a 
declaration that it could rescind the First Lien Notes’ 
acceleration without violating the automatic stay of creditors’ 
acts to enforce their remedies once bankruptcy occurs, 11 
U.S.C. § 362. However, should the stay apply, the Trustee 
asked the Court to lift it. 
 When the Bankruptcy Court did not act, on June 4, 
2014, the holders of a majority of the principal amount of the 
First Lien Notes sent a notice to EFIH rescinding 
acceleration, contingent on relief from the automatic stay. 
Two days later, the Bankruptcy Court granted EFIH’s motion 
to refinance. It ruled, however, that the refinancing would not 
prejudice the First Lien Noteholders’ rights in the pending 
adversary proceeding. 
 On June 19, 2014, EFIH paid off the First Lien Notes 
and refinanced the debt at a much lower interest rate of 
4.25%, saving “an estimated $13 million in interest per 
month.”  In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 527 B.R. at 
189. This of course disadvantaged the First Lien Noteholders, 
who had contracted to receive interest at 10% until the Notes’ 
full maturity in 2020. EFIH did not compensate the loss set 
by contract by paying the make-whole, which would have 
been approximately $431 million. 
 C. Refinancing the Second Lien Notes 
 Shortly after entering bankruptcy,  EFIH declared in an 
SEC 8-K filing that it “reserve[d] the right to . . . redeem . . . 
some or all of the outstanding . . . Second Lien Notes” but 
asserted that it “[wa]s under no obligation to do so.” See In Re 
Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. 14-50363 (Bankr. D. 
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Del.), Docket Entry 181, A-222. Aware of this, as well as the 
First Lien Noteholders’ predicament, the Trustees for the 
Second Lien Noteholders—Computershare Trust Company, 
N.A. and Computershare Trust Company of Canada—filed 
their own adversary proceeding on June 16, 2014. 
 Like the First Lien Trustee, the Second Lien Trustees 
sought a declaration that EFIH would have to pay the make-
whole if it chose to refinance the Second Lien Notes. The 
Second Lien Noteholders also issued a notice rescinding 
acceleration of that debt and requested retroactive relief from 
the automatic stay so that the rescission could take effect. 
 With the Bankruptcy Court’s permission, EFIH 
refinanced a portion of the Second Lien Notes on March 10, 
2015—again without paying the yield-protection amount. 
 D. First Lien Make-Whole Litigation 
 Nine months after granting leave to refinance the First 
Lien Notes, the Bankruptcy Court considered whether EFIH 
had to pay the make-whole. In re Energy Future Holdings 
Corp., 527 B.R. at 191-95.  The holding was that it did not. 
Id. 
 Although EFIH’s obligation to pay the make-whole 
appears in § 3.07 of the First Lien Indenture, the Court 
focused its reasoning on the acceleration provision in § 6.02. 
Because it took effect when EFIH entered bankruptcy but 
made no mention of the make-whole, the Court concluded 
that none was due. 1 
                                              
1 For the purpose of determining EFIH’s duty to pay any 
make-whole, the Bankruptcy Court assumed that it was 
“solvent and able to pay all allowed claims of [its] creditors in 
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 It further held that the automatic stay prevented the 
First Lien Noteholders’ attempt to rescind the Notes’ 
acceleration. Id. at 197. Finally, after trial in 2015, it denied 
the Trustee’s motion to lift the stay retroactively “to a date on 
or before June 19, 2014, to allow the Trustee to . . . decelerate 
the Notes.” In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 533 B.R. 
106, 116 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015). 
 These rulings put the First Lien Noteholders in a 
Catch-22. When EFIH filed for bankruptcy, the maturity of its 
debt accelerated. This, according to the Bankruptcy Court, cut 
off the First Lien Noteholders’ right to yield-protection. 
Rescission of the acceleration would have restored that right. 
But rescission was blocked by the automatic stay, which the 
Court refused to lift. 
 The District Court for the District of Delaware 
affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings in February 2016. In 
re Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. CV 15-620 RGA, 
2016 WL 627343, at *1–3 (D. Del. Feb. 16, 2016). 
 E. Second Lien Make-Whole Litigation  
 The Second Lien Noteholders fared no better than the 
First Lien Noteholders. Six months after EFIH refinanced a 
portion of the Second Lien Notes, the Court considered the 
Second Lien Noteholders’ entitlement to the make-whole. In 
construing the Second Lien Indenture’s provisions, the Court 
adopted its findings and conclusions from the make-whole 
litigation for the First Lien Noteholders. After rejecting 
arguments based on the few differences between the First and 
                                                                                                     
full.” In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 527 B.R. at 183. 
We do the same. Because we do not have any briefing on the 
matter even without that assumption, we do not consider 
whether insolvency might have affected EFIH’s obligations. 
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Second Lien Indentures’ texts, the Court held that the Second 
Lien Noteholders also were not entitled to yield-protection. In 
re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 539 B.R. 723, 733 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2015). The District Court again affirmed. In re: 
Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. CV 15-1011-RGA, 2016 
WL 1451045, at *4 (D. Del. Apr. 12, 2016). 
* * * * * 
 The First and Second Lien Trustees brought appeals on 
behalf of their respective Noteholders, which we 
consolidated. They argue the Bankruptcy and District Courts 
erred by holding that the Indentures did not require payment 
of the make-whole when EFIH redeemed the Notes after their 
maturity had accelerated. 
II. JURISDICTION AND GOVERNING LAW 
 We have jurisdiction to hear appeals from the 
Bankruptcy and District Courts in this Circuit under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158 and 1291. Statutory construction and contract 
interpretation are legal questions reviewed anew by us. The 
contracts at issue—the Indentures that control the Notes—are 
governed by New York law. First Lien Indenture § 13.08; 
Second Lien Indenture § 13.08. 
 “When interpreting state law, we follow a state’s 
highest court; if that state’s highest court has not provided 
guidance, we are charged with predicting how that court 
would resolve the issue.” Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Operations, Inc., 653 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 
2011). “To do so, we must take into consideration: (1) what 
that court has said in related areas; (2) the decisional law of 
the state intermediate courts; (3) federal cases interpreting 
state law; and (4) decisions from other jurisdictions that have 
discussed the issue.” Id. 
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 Here we look to the New York Court of Appeals, 
which has held that “[t]he fundamental, neutral precept of 
contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in 
accord with the parties’ intent.” Greenfield v. Philles Records, 
Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted). “The best evidence of what parties 
to a written agreement intend is what they say in their 
writing.” Id. “It is the role of the courts to enforce the 
agreement made by the parties—not to add, excise or distort 
the meaning of the terms they chose to include, thereby 
creating a new contract under the guise of construction.” 
NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina, 952 N.E.2d 482, 489–
90 (N.Y. 2011). “Adherence to these principles is particularly 
appropriate in a case like this involving interpretation of 
documents drafted by sophisticated, counseled parties and 
involving the loan of substantial sums of money.” Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 A. The First Lien Indenture 
 Although both Indentures contains many provisions, 
this case centers on the words of but two: §§ 3.07 and 6.02.2 
The former, noted earlier as titled “Optional Redemption,” 
states when the make-whole is due: “At any time prior to 
December 1, 2015, the Issuer may redeem all or a part of the 
                                              
2 In Sections A and B, we refer for convenience to the First 
Lien Indenture simply as the “Indenture.” Likewise, we mean 
the First Lien Notes and First Lien Noteholders when we 
refer to “the Notes” or “the Noteholders” in these Sections. 
Thereafter the two terms mean all debt instruments and their 
holders under both the First Lien and Second Lien Indentures, 
which themselves may be referred to collectively as the 
“Indentures.” 
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Notes at a redemption price equal to 100% of the principal 
amount of the Notes redeemed plus the Applicable Premium 
[i.e., the make-whole] . . . and accrued and unpaid interest” 
(emphasis in original). Indenture § 3.07. The premium 
decreases annually on a sliding scale between December 1, 
2015 and November 30, 2018. From December 1, 2018 until 
the Notes’ maturity date in 2020, the Notes may be optionally 
redeemed without payment of a premium. See Indenture 
§§ 1.01 (defining “Applicable Premium” and providing 
formula for its application) & 3.07(d) (setting premium 
amount for redemptions after December 1, 2015). 
 Section 6.02 provides that on the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition by EFIH “all outstanding Notes shall be due and 
payable immediately without further action or notice.” 
Indenture § 6.02; see also id. § 6.01 (defining bankruptcy as 
an event of default). 
 Any duty to pay the make-whole comes from § 3.07. It 
leaves us with three questions: was there a redemption; was it 
optional; and if yes to both, did it occur before December 1, 
2015? 
 Section 3.07 does not define “redemption.” As a 
redemption “usu[ally] refers to the repurchase of a bond 
before maturity,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1390 (9th ed. 
2009), EFIH contends that we should limit the term to mean 
only repayments of debt that pre-date the debt’s maturity. 
Section 6.02 accelerated the Notes’ maturity to the date EFIH 
entered bankruptcy—April 29, 2014. It refinanced the Notes 
several weeks later. Thus it argues that its post-maturity 
refinancing was not a redemption. 
 But contrary to that position, New York and federal 
courts deem “redemption” to include both pre- and post-
maturity repayments of debt. See e.g., Chesapeake Energy 
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Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 773 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 
2014) (in interpreting New York law, to “redeem” is to 
“repay[] . . . a debt security . . . at or before maturity” 
(quoting Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and Investment 
Terms 587 (8th ed. 2010)); Treasurer of New Jersey v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing regulations permitting bondholders to “present . . . 
long-matured savings bond[s] for redemption”); Fed. Nat’l 
Mortg. Ass’n v. Miller, 473 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1984) (“debtor may redeem” mortgage by “pay[ing] . . . 
accelerated debt”); see also N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-623, Official 
Comment No. 2 (“To redeem the collateral . . . of a secured 
obligation [that] has been accelerated, it would be necessary 
to tender the entire balance.”). Accordingly, EFIH’s June 19, 
2014 refinancing was a “redemption” within the meaning of 
§ 3.07. 
 Whether the redemption was “[o]ptional” is next up. 
EFIH argues that refinancing the Notes was not optional 
because § 6.02 made them “due and payable immediately 
without further action or notice” once it was in bankruptcy. 
EFIH, however, filed for Chapter 11 protection voluntarily. 
Once there, it had the option, per its plan of reorganization, to 
reinstate the accelerated Notes’ original maturity date under 
Bankruptcy Code § 1124(2) rather than paying them off 
immediately. It chose not to do so, and instead followed the 
path laid out six months before in its SEC 8-K filing. 
 EFIH contends nonetheless that any redemption was 
mandatory rather than optional. But this contention does not 
match the facts. Indeed “a chapter 11 debtor that has the 
capacity to refinance secured debt on better terms . . . is in the 
same position within bankruptcy as it would be outside 
bankruptcy, and cannot reasonably assert that its repayment 
of debt is not ‘voluntary.’” Scott K. Charles & Emil A. 
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Kleinhaus, Prepayment Clauses in Bankruptcy, 15 Am. 
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 537, 552 (2007). 
 Events leading up to the post-petition financing on 
June 19, 2014 demonstrate that the redemption was very 
much at EFIH’s option. To repeat, months before its Chapter 
11 filing EFIH announced its plan to redeem the Notes before 
their stated maturity date. In re Energy Future Holdings 
Corp., 527 B.R. at 189. And after filing for bankruptcy, it 
produced another 8‑K stating that it may, “but [wa]s under no 
obligation” to, redeem the similarly situated Second Lien 
Notes. In Re Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. 14-50363 
(Bankr. D. Del.), Docket Entry 181, A-222. 
 The irony is that the Noteholders did not want to be 
paid back on June 19, 2014. They attempted to rescind the 
Notes’ acceleration on June 4, 2014, but were blocked by the 
automatic stay. In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 533 B.R. 
at 108. When EFIH redeemed the Notes, it did so “on a non-
consensual basis,” that is, over the Noteholders’ objection. 
J.A. 1214. Logic leaves no doubt this redemption of the Notes 
was “[o]ptional” under § 3.07. 
 And, only to close the loop, all this occurred before 
December 1, 2015. Hence § 3.07 on its face requires that 
EFIH pay the Noteholders the yield-protection payment. 
 B. The Relationship Between §§ 3.07 And 6.02 (Or 
 Whether § 6.02, Once Triggered, Annuls § 3.07) 
 At oral argument, EFIH’s counsel described §§ 3.07 
and 6.02 as “different pathways” that we must choose 
between. Only the latter is relevant, the argument goes, 
because it addresses post-maturity payment more specifically 
than § 3.07, and specific contract provisions govern over 
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more general ones. See Muzak Corp. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 133 
N.E.2d 688, 690 (N.Y. 1956). 
 It is not obvious why EFIH believes § 6.02 addresses 
the consequences of the June 2014 redemption more 
specifically than § 3.07 or why we must choose between 
them. The two sections simply address different things: § 6.02 
causes the maturity of EFIH’s debt to accelerate on its 
bankruptcy,  and § 3.07 causes a make-whole to become due 
when there is an optional redemption before December 1, 
2015. Rather than “different pathways,” together they form 
the map to guide the parties through a post-acceleration 
redemption. In any event, § 3.07 is the only provision that 
specifically addresses redemptions. 
 To support its position, EFIH looks primarily to In re 
AMR Corp., 730 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013). It focused on an 
indenture’s acceleration provision to determine whether a 
make-whole was due. Crucially, however, that provision 
addressed outright whether a make-whole would be due 
following acceleration. 
“[I]f an Event of Default referred to in . . . 
Section 4.01(g) [i.e., the voluntary filing of a 
bankruptcy petition] . . . shall have occurred and 
be continuing, then and in every such case the 
unpaid principal amount of the Equipment 
Notes then outstanding, together with accrued 
but unpaid interest thereon and all other 
amounts due thereunder (but for the avoidance 
of doubt, without Make–Whole Amount), 
shall immediately and without further act 
become due and payable without presentment, 
demand, protest or notice, all of which are 
hereby waived. 
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Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
 AMR is the easy case; just follow the text. The litigants 
took a route suggested by the New York Court of Appeals in 
NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina: parties that want 
obligations to cease when accelerated should say so in their 
agreement. 952 N.E.2d at 490 (“Had Argentina intended that 
its responsibility to pay interest twice a year cease upon 
maturity, it could easily have clarified that intent in any 
number of ways.”). 
 In our case, § 6.02 makes no mention of the make-
whole. EFIH argues that this silence saps § 3.07’s effect. On a 
general note, that reading would cross cords with our duty to 
“give full meaning and effect to all of [the Indenture's] 
provisions.” Chesapeake Energy Corp., 773 F.3d at 113-14 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Contracts are . . . to be 
interpreted to avoid inconsistencies and to give meaning to all 
[their] terms.” Barrow v. Lawrence United Corp., 146 A.D.2d 
15, 18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). More specifically, EFIH’s 
interpretation conflicts with the New York Court of Appeals’ 
statement that “[w]hile it is understood that acceleration 
advances the maturity date of the debt,” there is no “rule of 
New York law declaring that other terms of the contract not 
necessarily impacted by acceleration . . . automatically cease 
to be enforceable after acceleration.” NML Capital, 952 
N.E.2d at 492. Accordingly, § 3.07 stands on its own, 
unswayed by the Indenture’s other provisions. 
 EFIH alternatively argues that §§ 6.02 and 3.07 are in 
conflict, so that only one may apply to the June 2014 
redemption. Subsection 3.07(e) prescribes detailed notice 
procedures for EFIH to follow before redeeming the Notes, 
while § 6.02 makes the Notes “due and payable immediately 
without further action or notice.” If the notice procedures 
were not followed, no redemption could follow. Yet EFIH 
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offers no reason why it could not have complied with 
§ 3.07(e)’s notice procedures. In any event, it cannot use its 
own failure to notify to absolve its duty to pay the make-
whole. Any conflict between the two provisions in this 
instance is illusory. 
 We know no reason why we should choose between 
§§ 3.07 and 6.02 when both plainly apply. By its own terms, 
§ 3.07 governs the optional redemption embedded in the 
refinancing and requires payment of the make-whole. It 
surpasses strange to hold that silence in § 6.02 supersedes 
§ 3.07’s simple script. 
 C. The Second Lien Indenture’s Additional 
 Language 
 As mentioned above, the Second Lien Indenture’s 
acceleration provision contains words not present in the First 
Lien Indenture. These additions make explicit in the Second 
Lien Indenture the link between acceleration under §6.02 and 
the make-whole for an optional redemption per § 3.07. While 
for the First Lien Indenture these concepts are without cross-
reference and separate, in the Second Lien Indenture they are 
tied together. Sections 3.07 and 6.02 are not merely 
compatible but complementary. In any event, the result is the 
same no matter the Indenture—there were optional 
redemptions before a date certain, thereby triggering make-
whole premiums. 
 When EFIH filed its bankruptcy petition, Second Lien 
Indenture § 6.02 caused “all principal of and premium, if any, 
interest . . . [,] and any other monetary obligations on the 
outstanding [Second Lien] Notes [to] be[come] due and 
payable immediately” (emphasis added). Compare First Lien 
Indenture § 6.02 (“all outstanding Notes shall be due and 
payable immediately”). The words “premium, if any,” are 
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most naturally read to reference § 3.07’s “Applicable 
Premium”—that is, the make-whole. 
 The most EFIH musters is that the Second Lien 
Indenture could have been even more specific by replacing 
“premium, if any,” with “a premium owed under section 
3.07” or “Applicable Premium or other premium owed as if 
repayment under this section were an Optional Redemption 
under section 3.07.” EFIH’s Br. at 24-25. But we see no 
reason to demand such exactness. Indeed, EFIH has not 
suggested any other “premium” the drafters could have had in 
mind. 
 True, in a case called Momentive, the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York held the words 
“premium, if any,” were not specific enough to require 
payment of a make-whole in similar circumstances. In re 
MPM Silicones, LLC, No. 14-22503-RDD, 2014 WL 
4436335, at *13 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 
B.R. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Momentive”). We believe, 
however, the result in Momentive conflicts with that 
indenture’s text and fails to honor the parties’ bargain. For 
these and additional reasons discussed below, we find it 
unpersuasive. 
 By including the words “premium, if any,” in its 
acceleration provision, the Second Lien Indenture leaves no 
doubt that §§ 3.07 and 6.02 work together. The latter is 
explicit that a premium is in play, and the only relevant 
premium provision is the former. Thus both remained 
applicable following bankruptcy, and, pursuant to the 
agreement struck with the Second Lien Noteholders, they are 
entitled to the make-whole. 
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 D. The Effect of Acceleration on Make-Whole 
 Provisions 
 Notwithstanding the result dictated by § 3.07’s text in 
both Indentures, EFIH asserts that it should not have to pay 
the make-whole because § 6.02 caused the Notes’ maturity to 
accelerate before it paid them off. Citing a New York trial 
court opinion, Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Uniondale Realty 
Assocs., 816 N.Y.S.2d 831, 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) 
(“Northwestern”), it argues that courts must close their eyes 
to make-whole provisions once a debt’s maturity has 
accelerated. 
 In interpreting laws of a state, we need not follow the 
judgments of its trial courts. See MRL Dev. I, LLC v. 
Whitecap Inv. Corp., 823 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The 
Superior Court of the Virgin Islands . . . is not the highest 
court of the Territory or even an intermediate appellate court, 
but rather a trial court. Accordingly, we are not bound by 
Superior Court decisions” (internal brackets, citations, and 
quotation marks omitted)). But even if we were inclined to do 
so here, EFIH’s interpretation of Northwestern conflicts with 
the pronouncements of New York’s highest court, which we 
follow on questions of New York law. See Illinois Nat. Ins. 
Co., 653 F.3d at 231. 
 As we noted above, the New York Court of Appeals 
stated unequivocally in NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina 
that “[w]hile it is understood that acceleration advances the 
maturity date of the debt, [it was] unaware of any rule of New 
York law declaring that other terms of the contract not 
necessarily impacted by acceleration . . . automatically cease 
to be enforceable after acceleration.” 952 N.E.2d at 492. Put 
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differently, contract terms like § 3.07 that are applicable 
before acceleration remain so afterward. 
 In NML Capital, New York’s highest Court answered 
several questions certified to it by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. Id. at 486. Among them was “whether 
Argentina’s obligation to make [certain contractually 
established interest] payments to bondholders continued after 
maturity or acceleration of the indebtedness[.]” Id. at 486. 
Argentina contended that, after the maturity of its debt had 
accelerated, bondholders were entitled only to their principal 
and any accrued interest. Id. at 490. Acceleration, it argued, 
terminated its duty to make biannual interest payments 
mandated by the bond documents. Id. at 487. 
 In rejecting those assertions, the New York Court of 
Appeals held that “in New York the consequences of 
acceleration of the debt depend on the language chosen by the 
parties in the pertinent loan agreement.” Id. at 492. “Had 
Argentina . . . intended that its responsibility to pay interest 
twice a year cease upon maturity, it could easily have 
clarified that intent in any number of ways.” Id. at 490. For 
example, the bond documents could have specified that the 
payment “obligation continued ‘until’ the maturity date” or 
could have provided “that interest payments were to be made 
until the principal was due, thereby referring back to the loan 
maturity date.” Id. However, because the bond language that 
Argentina pay biannual interest payments made no reference 
to acceleration or maturity, it remained effective following 
the bonds’ acceleration. Id. at 493. The takeaway for us is that 
§ 3.07 applies no less following acceleration of the Notes’ 
maturity than it would to a pre-acceleration redemption. 
 Despite the New York Court of Appeals’ holding in 
NML Capital and still riding the Northwestern horse, EFIH 
contends that we should decline to require payment of the 
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make-whole because the trial court declared that a 
“prepayment premium will not be enforced under default 
circumstances in the absence of a clause which so states[.]” 
Northwestern, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 836. It held that a mortgage 
lender who chose to foreclose following default was not 
entitled to a “prepayment premium” because foreclosure had 
advanced the debt’s maturity date. Id.  “[P]repayment is a 
payment before maturity[,]” but after foreclosure prepayment 
is impossible as the debt has become due and payable 
immediately. Id. at 837 (emphasis in original). According to 
EFIH, Northwestern sets a rule that, unless an agreement 
clearly provides for it, no make-whole payment is due after a 
note’s acceleration. 
 No doubt prepayment premiums are the price of “an 
option voluntarily to prepay the loan and terminate the 
mortgage before the maturity.” In re S. Side House, LLC, 451 
B.R. 248, 267 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom, U.S. 
Bank Nat. Ass’n v. S. Side House, LLC, No. 11-CV-4135 
ARR, 2012 WL 273119 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2012); accord 
Northwestern, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 836. “[A]cceleration, by 
definition, advances the maturity date of the debt so that 
payment thereafter is not prepayment but instead is payment 
made after maturity[,]” and logically the option to prepay can 
no longer be exercised after maturity. Matter of LHD Realty 
Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 330–31 (7th Cir. 1984); D.I.S., LLC v. 
Sagos, 832 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) 
(“prepayment” penalty did not apply to tender of mortgage 
principal and interest following acceleration because post-
acceleration payments are not “prepayments”). 
 Unlike prepayment, however, “redemption” of “a debt 
security” may occur “at or before maturity.” Chesapeake 
Energy Corp., 773 F.3d at 116 (emphasis added). Thus, while 
a premium contingent on “prepayment” could not take effect 
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after the debt’s maturity,3 a premium tied to a “redemption” 
would be unaffected by acceleration of a debt’s maturity. 
 Our understanding of New York law is that it follows a 
logical path: prepayments cannot occur when payment is now 
due by acceleration of the debt’s maturity. If parties want to 
mandate a “prepayment” premium following acceleration, 
they must clearly state it in their agreement. This is the 
Northwestern rule. 
 Recently, however, bankruptcy courts, including the 
Bankruptcy Court here, have stretched Northwestern beyond 
its language and applied its clear-statement rule to yield-
protection payments not styled as prepayment premiums. In 
the Momentive case we mentioned in our discussion of the 
Second Lien Indenture, a Bankruptcy Court considered 
language similar to that of both Indentures and nearly 
identical to the text of the Second Lien Indenture. Like the 
Indentures here, the Momentive indenture required payment 
of a make-whole on optional redemptions occurring before a 
particular date. Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *13. The 
Court, however, disallowed the lenders’ claim for a make-
whole, declaring it “well-settled law in New York” that a 
make-whole, like a prepayment premium, will only be due on 
a default and acceleration “when a clear and unambiguous 
clause calls” for it. Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at *12-
*13 (citing Northwestern). The Delaware Bankruptcy Court 
followed the same line, declining to enforce the make-whole 
provision because “an indenture must contain express 
                                              
3 Even though a debtor cannot prepay what is already due, 
courts have enforced prepayment premiums after acceleration 
when the debtor has intentionally defaulted in order to avoid 
the premium.  See e.g., In re S. Side House, LLC, 451 B.R. at 
269; Northwestern, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
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language requiring payment of a prepayment premium upon 
acceleration; otherwise, it is not owed.” In re Energy Future 
Holdings Corp., 527 B.R. at 192 (construing First Lien 
Indenture); accord In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 539 
B.R. at 733 (construing Second Lien Indenture). 
 By denying the make-whole after the Notes’ 
acceleration, the Bankruptcy Court pushed the Northwestern 
rule beyond its language and underlying policy concerns. 
First, its application of the rule is off point because § 3.07 in 
the Indentures does not use the word “prepayment.” 
Northwestern responds, in part, to the linguistic paradox 
created by the idea of a prepayment following acceleration. 
“Once the maturity date is accelerated to the present, it is no 
longer possible to prepay the debt before maturity.” 
Northwestern, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 834. That is why, if parties 
want a “prepayment” premium to survive acceleration and 
maturity, they must clearly state it. 
 The Indentures here present no linguistic tension to 
resolve. Nothing in § 6.02 negates the premium § 3.07 
requires if an optional redemption occurs before a stated date. 
Acceleration here has no bearing on whether and when the 
make-whole is due. 
 EFIH argues that, even though § 3.07 does not use the 
word “prepayment,” the make-whole is in substance a 
prepayment premium, and thus the Northwestern rule should 
apply. But we must give effect to the “words and phrases” the 
parties chose. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 773 F.3d at 113–14; 
NML Capital, 952 N.E.2d at 489–90. By avoiding the word 
“prepayment” and using the term “redemption,” they decided 
that the make-whole would apply without regard to the Notes’ 
maturity. 
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 Moreover, beneath the Northwestern holding was a 
policy concern that lenders should not be permitted “to 
recover prepayment premiums after default and acceleration 
in order to preserve an income stream . . . absent any 
‘voluntary’ prepayment.” Northwestern, 816 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
There the mortgagee seeking the prepayment premium had 
elected to foreclose in order to recoup its investment 
immediately. Id. at 833. Ordinarily, by electing to accelerate 
the debt, a lender forgoes its right to a stream of payments in 
favor of immediate repayment. Matter of LHD Realty Corp., 
726 F.2d at 331 & n.4. The Northwestern Judge was 
concerned that lenders should not be able to seek immediate 
repayment and pile on by also receiving a premium. Here, by 
contrast, the Noteholders did not seek immediate payment. 
EFIH voluntarily redeemed the Notes over the Noteholders’ 
objection. Hence even the policy guiding Northwestern does 
not reach this case. 
 Finally, to repeat what we said at the outset, by 
declining to enforce § 3.07 after acceleration, the Bankruptcy 
Court ran afoul of New York authority by failing to enforce a 
contract provision—§ 3.07—not affected by acceleration. 
NML Capital, 952 N.E.2d at 492. To reach its conclusion, it 
followed Momentive, which described “automatic 
acceleration clauses” as “negating” the effect of make-whole 
redemption provisions. Momentive, 2014 WL 4436335, at 
*14. That is not what NML Capital tells us. 
 EFIH answers that the Noteholders should have taken 
note of bankruptcy courts’ novel application of Northwestern 
and insisted on clearer language in the Indenture. See e.g., In 
re Anchor Resolution Corp., 221 B.R. 330, 334 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 1998) (“If the maturity of any Series B Note shall be 
accelerated . . . [,] there shall become due and payable . . . as 
compensation to the holders . . . a premium equal to the 
Make-Whole Amount.”). But this puts the burden backward; 
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if EFIH wanted its duty to pay the make-whole on optional 
redemption to terminate on acceleration of its debt, it needed 
to make clear that § 6.02 trumps § 3.07. See NML Capital, 
952 N.E.2d at 490. The burden to make that showing is with 
EFIH. To place it on the Noteholders for EFIH’s decision to 
redeem the Notes is a bridge too far. 
* * * * * 
 Our “primary objective . . . is to give effect to the 
intent of the parties as revealed by the language of their 
agreement.” Chesapeake Energy Corp., 773 F.3d at 113–14. 
The language of the First Lien Indenture requires EFIH to pay 
a make-whole if it redeems the First Lien Notes at its option 
before December 1, 2015, and the Second Lien Indenture 
requires the same for redemptions of Second Lien Notes 
before May 15, 2016 or March 1, 2017 (depending on the 
initial maturity date of the particular debt instruments). EFIH 
redeemed the First Lien Notes at its option on June 19, 2014 
and redeemed a portion of the Second Lien Notes on March 
10, 2015. Redemptions, not prepayments, occurred here, they 
were at the election of EFIH, and they occurred before the 
respective dates noted. Statements of New York law by its 
highest Court and the federal Circuit Court in New York 
reinforce our conclusion that EFIH must pay the make-whole 
per the Indenture language before us.4 
                                              
4 Because we hold that the Noteholders are entitled to the 
make-whole, we do not reach the Trustees’ alternative 
arguments that the Bankruptcy Court should have lifted the 
automatic stay to permit rescission of the Notes’ acceleration 
or that the Court should have allowed the Noteholders a 
contingent claim for the make-whole or a claim for contract 
damages. 
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 The judgments of the District Court are reversed with 
instructions to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Any future appeals 
shall return to this panel. 
